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David Cameron, then the British Prime Minister, stated in his foreword to the 
UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) that one of the priori-
ties for Britain should be to ‘remain a world leader in cyber security and ensure 
we have the capability to respond rapidly to crises as they emerge’.1 This article 
analyses how the British government is handling the threats the UK is now facing 
at the high end of the cyber-security spectrum through potential attacks on UK 
critical national infrastructure (CNI).
The article will proceed in two stages. First, it will look at the public and 
private organisations and mechanisms that have been put in place to try to build 
cyber-resilience for CNI within the UK. Second, it will question whether these 
are sufficient to deal with the depth of the problems now facing the UK, and 
many other countries, in protecting their computer-controlled CNI assets. In 
doing so it will offer a series of recommendations to help increase CNI resilience, 
given that mainstream policy debates tend to subsume CNI vulnerabilities into 
much broader discussions of cyber security and cybercrime when CNI protection 
deserves considered and focused debate.2
Outlining the threats
Traditional forms of authority and power in the UK are vested in parliament, 
the judiciary, the police force and the military. Each is under challenge in cyber-
space. The British government is largely unable to exercise sovereign control of 
* This work is funded and supported by the SCADA-CSL programme of Airbus Group Endevr Wales, a joint 
research funding initiative of Airbus Group and the Welsh government. I wish to thank my partners on this 
project who have facilitated this programme of work and helped enormously with the research underpinning 
this article. They are: Dr Kevin Jones, who put together this project at Airbus Group Innovations; Hugh 
Soulsby, also of Airbus Group Innovations; Professor Andrew Blyth and Peter Eden of the University of 
South Wales; and Dr Peter Burnap and Dr Yulia Cherdantseva of Cardiff University. All are most valued 
colleagues on the SCADA Cyber Security Lifecycles Project that has funded and enabled this article and our 
related research. I also wish to thank the anonymous peer reviewers for this journal for helping make this a 
sharper and more comprehensive article, and Professor Andrew Dorman for his support as Commissioning 
Editor of International Affairs.
1 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: a secure and prosperous 
United Kingdom, Cm. 9161 (London, Nov. 2015), p. 6.
2 Such as that found in the International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, where computer scientists and 
engineers from academia and industry actively discuss these questions.
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UK cyberspace as it is unbounded by geographical constraints. The 2015 SDSR 
rightly highlighted that: ‘The range of cyber actors threatening the UK has 
grown. The threat is increasingly asymmetric and global.’3 There are few clear 
and unambiguous norms, rules and regulations in cyberspace, and the legal and 
governance frameworks currently in place are contested.4 As noted above, this is 
not UK-specific but a global problem; the Deputy Director of the US National 
Security Agency (NSA), Richard Ledgett, publicly outlined these jurisdictional 
difficulties in an interview with the BBC in October 2015.5
Current cyber norms, rules and regulations are rooted at the national level and 
include laws governing what can or cannot be said or done on social media such 
as Twitter and Facebook. These have had to be updated or enacted as technology, 
and the take-up of that technology, evolve and, as they do so, change social, 
political and security dynamics. This is a fluid and dynamic environment and 
the law, whether national or supranational, is constantly playing catch-up with 
technology and what technology enables. Through this process of technological 
innovation and take-up:
anyone with a laptop and a network connection can transmit information, whether 
‘one-to-one’ or ‘one-to-many’, effectively globally and instantaneously in a variety of 
forms; process information ...  easily and cheaply with standard commercial software; and 
store information in vast quantities indefinitely on cheap, miniature and portable digital 
devices, or in the ‘cloud’, independent of any particular device.6
Within this rapidly evolving context it is clear that the British government at 
both national and regional levels is faced with a series of mounting difficulties in 
attempting to manage an ever-growing and deepening number of cybercrimes and 
cyber breaches, now seen every day in the UK and across the globe. The range 
of these is accelerating, promoted both by the expansion and low entry costs of 
computer technology and by the benefits this bestows and the malicious activi-
ties it enables in the ever-growing ‘Internet of Things’, which refers to the mass 
proliferation of sensors, devices and smart products, used to gather and transmit 
data over the Internet. 
The actors behind these crimes and breaches are both foreign and domestic. 
They range from ‘script kiddies’—(predominantly) young people engaging in 
illegal activities ranging from probing organizations to distributed denial of 
service attacks, either singly or through collectives such as the ‘hacktivist’ group 
‘Anonymous’—through to sophisticated hackers and crackers who could repre-
3 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 19.
4 See e.g. Paul Walker, ‘Law of the horse to law of the submarine: the future of state behaviour in cyberspace’, in 
M. Maybaum, A.-M. Osula and L. LindstrÖm, eds, 2015 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: architectures 
in cyberspace (Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE [Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence] Publications, 
2015), pp. 93–104.
5 Gordon Corera, ‘NSA warns of growing danger of cyber-attack by nation states’, BBC News, 27 Oct. 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-34641382. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all 
URLs in this article were accessible on 15 July 2016.)
6 David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the state: towards a strategy for cyber-power (Abingdon: Routledge/
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), p. 112. See also Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in cyberspace: 
national security and information warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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sent Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) to a nation-state. This poses a number 
of difficulties for the UK, and other nations that uphold the rule of law, which is 
‘concerned with the organization of public authority within states and the ability 
to make policy and to regulate behaviour effectively ...  [entailing] both authority 
and control’.7 
The exercise of such authority and control is problematic given that the internet 
has no geographical borders and domestic state intrusion is widely resisted (as 
evidenced in the wake of the PRISM mass surveillance programme and polar-
izing views of the whistleblower and ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden). 
The internet can be policed only weakly, owing to the sheer volume of traffic 
(Big Data and associated metadata), and a series of political, social and legal issues 
surrounding norms and jurisdictions. As Jamie Bartlett notes in his book on the 
hidden ‘dark net’, ‘the battle for ideas, influence and impact is moving online’ (and 
is particularly active among extremist groups).8 
Placing these observations in a wider context, Betz and Stevens argue that in 
terms of ‘cyber war’, ‘Perhaps the most persistent concern ...  is the idea that 
it [the cyber realm] deepens asymmetries of power between strong states and 
weaker states, and between all states and some “super-empowered” non-state 
actors ...  as David proved against Goliath, strength can be beaten.’9 Such ‘David 
and Goliath’ metaphors draw their basis from the huge extent of reliance upon 
computer technology in developed states. This dependence, and the concomitant 
vulnerability to cyber attack, is at its most potent in relation to Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS)—particularly SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
systems. They are a deeply embedded and longstanding technology in the UK 
and many other developed states, dating back to the 1940s. Many SCADA systems 
have been in place since the 1980s and 1990s, when the internet was in its infancy 
and computer security not an acute consideration. Today, the situation is very 
different. Attacks on these computer-controlled industrial systems could cause 
electricity blackouts and water shortages, or disrupt financial services. Now there 
are publicly discussed fears of a ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’, a ‘cyber 9/11’ or even a state-
wide ‘Cybergeddon’ attack, aimed at crippling or seriously damaging a nation, 
which could cascade to other states through attacks on CNI.10
The UK’s national infrastructure is defined by the government as: 
those facilities, systems, sites and networks [physical and electronic] necessary for the 
functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life 
in the UK depends ...  There are certain ‘critical’ elements of national infrastructure that 
if lost would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life in the UK. 
These critical elements make up the critical national infrastructure (CNI).11
7 Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the state, p. 57.
8 Jamie Bartlett, The Dark Net: inside the digital underworld (London: Heinemann, 2014), p. 49.
9 Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the state, p. 90.
10 See e.g. Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber war: the next threat to national security and what to do about 
it (London: ECCO, 2010); Elisabeth B. Miller and Thom Shanker, ‘Panetta warns of dire threat of cyberattack 
on US’, New York Times, 11 Oct. 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-
threat-of-cyberattack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
11 This definition is ‘broadly similar’ to that of the EU. See Cabinet Office, Strategic framework and policy statement 
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The potential for disruption or damage of CNI was recognized by the 2015 
SDSR, which reasserted cyber attacks as a Tier One threat to national security. 
It warned that:
Growing numbers of states, with state-level resources, are developing advanced capabili-
ties which are potentially deployable in conflicts, including against CNI and government 
institutions. And non-state actors, including terrorists and cyber criminals can use easily 
available cyber tools and technology for destructive purposes.12 
UK central government organizations and responsibilities
UK central government departments and agencies, including the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD), work with other governments across a range of common issues. 
For the MoD these channels of collaboration include the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office’s (FCO’s) International Cyber Policy Unit and NATO;13 at the 
European level they include the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA).14
Domestically there is little direct ‘governance’ of CNI in the UK comparable 
to the way nationalized industries were run centrally by government prior to 
their privatization during the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, as CNI is largely owned 
and operated by private industry, its governance resembles more a form of macro-
management in terms of oversight and regulation, similar to the way the National 
Health Service and National Rail are now run. Micro-management in the nine 
sectors that comprise CNI (communications, emergency services, energy, financial 
services, food, government, health, transport, water), each of which constitutes 
a large and complex set of organizations with enormous budgets, is undertaken 
through regulation and oversight via formal and informal statutory regulators 
and legal bodies. This is in line with neo-liberal practices that promote minimum 
state intervention. 
Activities to combat threats to SCADA and other ICS embedded across industries 
are currently overseen in the UK by a national Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT-UK) established in 2014, along with the Government Computer 
Emergency Response Team, whose task is to provide warnings, alerts and assis-
tance to public-sector organizations. CERT-UK is one of many such bodies that 
have been set up by national governments. It is designed to ‘work closely with 
industry, government and academia to enhance UK cyber resilience’.15 Another 
initiative was the formation of the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partner-
on improving the resilience of critical infrastructure to disruption from natural hazards (London, March 2010), p. 8, https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62504/strategic-framework.pdf. 
12 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 19.
13 MoD, Cyber primer (Swindon, Dec. 2013), pp. 1-19–1-20, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/360973/20140716_DCDC_Cyber_Primer_Internet_Secured.pdf.
14 Pinsent Masons, ‘EU lacks “unified vision” for “important” standards on cyber security, says ENISA’, Out-
Law.com, 30 March 2105, http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/march/eu-lacks-unified-vision-for-
important-standards-on-cyber-security-says-enisa/.
15 https://www.cert.gov.uk/.
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ship (CiSP), which by 2014 had a membership of 750 organizations.16 CiSP is 
described in the following terms:
CiSP is now a part of CERT-UK. CiSP was launched in March 2013 and is a joint, collabo-
rative initiative between industry and government to share cyber threat and vulnerability 
information in order to increase overall situational awareness of the cyber threat and there-
fore reduce the impact upon UK business ...  CERT-UK will be able to add the day to 
day experience of working with critical national infrastructure companies in handling the 
incidents they face alongside the international dimension.17
In addition, the CiSP forums (which were established in the run-up to the 2014 
Commonwealth Games in Glasgow and that year’s NATO summit in Newport, 
Wales) are intended to become ‘permanent hosts for such information sharing in 
Scotland and Wales’.18 These programmes of work and education were augmented 
in June 2014 with the launch of ‘Cyber Essentials’, which is intended to be
a major new Government-backed and industry supported scheme to incentivise 
widespread adoption of basic security controls that will help to protect organizations 
against the commonest kind of internet attacks. The scheme is constructed to be affordable 
and practical for all firms, small as well as large. Certification comes with a badge which 
firms can use to help demonstrate their security credentials to customers and investors, 
and which insurers can take into account when considering firms for relevant insurance 
policies.19
It is run by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Depart-
ment for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)20 and the Cabinet Office, and also 
seeks to improve cyber-security risk management and companies’ ability to take 
out insurance against cyber attacks.21 
In the attempt to keep up to date with the multiplying cyber threats Britain 
faces, CERT-UK works with a number of other agencies—some public sector and 
some private. Also, working with Britain’s allies (particularly the United States) 
to combat cross-border threats, it ‘oversees a programme of exercises to support 
critical sectors in preparing for the potential impact of a destructive cyber attack’, 
including through the Heartbleed and Shellshock vulnerabilities.22
Activities to combat serious crime are undertaken by the National Crime 
Agency (NCA), established in October 2013, which now incorporates legacy 
organizations including the National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU), the Police 
e-Crime Unit and the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA).23 The NCCU 
16 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: report on progress and forward plans December 2014 (London, Dec. 
2015), p. 5, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/386093/The_
UK_Cyber_Security_Strategy_Report_on_Progress_and_Forward_Plans_-_De___.pdf. 
17 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 5.
18 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, pp. 5–6. 
19 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 7. 
20 This is now likely to be taken up by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) which 
was created in July 2016.
21 ‘HMIC report highlights concern over cybercrime plans’, BBC News, 10 April 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-26963938. 
22 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, pp. 13–14. 
23 MI5, ‘What we do’, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/major-areas-of-work.html. See 
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‘brought together specialists from the Police Central e-Crime Unit in the Metro-
politan Police Service and SOCA Cyber to create expert technical, tactical intel-
ligence and investigation teams’.24 These bodies work with GCHQ ‘to develop the 
skills and technology required to combat elite cyber crime threats to the UK’.25 
There are also nine Regional Organized Crime Units (ROCUs), each of which 
has a dedicated cybercrime unit. This also includes Operation Falcon (Fraud and 
Linked Crime Online) within the Metropolitan Police—the largest of the UK’s 
48 police forces and the lead force for cybercrime.26 The remit of Falcon, a joint 
operation by the Fraud Squad and the Met’s cybercrime unit, is ‘to disrupt and 
arrest cyber criminals attacking London businesses’.27 In addition the NCCU has 
augmented its activities overseas to work with Europol, US agencies and Interpol 
to understand the global cybercrime threat, coordinate activity against priority 
threats and develop relationships with international partners to support coopera-
tion on prosecutions, including posting officers overseas.28
With the vast majority of cybercrime emanating from abroad, more needs to be 
done, including through the ‘Cyber Streetwise’ public awareness campaign.29 The 
availability of inexpensive software, and of online evasion software and tactics on 
the internet, makes it difficult for the police to track and trace cybercrime, and 
they have to assess whether they are able to pour scarce resources into difficult 
prosecutions.30 The use of The Onion Router (TOR) and proxy servers only 
compounds the problems facing the police and intelligence agencies in terms of 
identification/attribution and prosecution, as does the growing use of encryption 
by major technology companies.31 As the police might well be tasked as one of the 
‘first responders’ to any industrial emergency, their role is important, but they are 
under-resourced and they do not appear to have received any new money from 
the SDSR.32 This deficiency needs to be addressed.
The UK government tasked the ROCUs with sharing cyber-security informa-
tion regionally to assist local businesses to protect themselves from cybercrime. 
This information-sharing operation, carried out in conjunction with CERT-UK, 
also NCA, ‘Working in partnership’, http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/working-in-part-
nership.
24 NCA, ‘National Cyber Crime Unit’, http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/
national-cyber-crime-unit.
25 HM Government, 2010 to 2015 government policy: cyber security, policy paper (London, updated May 2015),  appen-
dix 1, ‘Setting up a National Cyber Crime Unit’, https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/keeping-the-uk-
safe-in-cyberspace/supporting-pages/setting-up-a-national-cyber-crime-unit.
26 45 of these cover geographical regions and three are special police forces like the British Transport Police.
27 HM Government, 2010 to 2015 government policy: cyber security, appendix 1, ‘Setting up a National Cyber Crime 
Unit’.
28 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, pp. 11, 16–18. 
29 HM Government, ‘New campaign urges people to be “Cyber Streetwise”’, https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/new-campaign-urges-people-to-be-cyber-streetwise; https://www.cyberstreetwise.com/.
30 Views expressed under the Chatham House rule at the conference ‘Enhancing the UK’s cyber resilience: 
working in partnership to reduce cyber risk in the digital age’, London, 24 March 2015.
31 See e.g. Joe Miller, ‘Google and Apple to introduce default encryption’, BBC News, 19 Sept. 2014, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-29276955; ‘Tor Project makes efforts to debug dark web’, BBC News, 23 
July 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28447023.
32 Derek du Preez, ‘London Police Commissioner’s cyber-crime open letter laughed at by industry’, Computer-
world UK, 13 Aug. 2013, http://www.computerworlduk.com/security/london-police-commissioners-cyber-
crime-open-letter-laughed-at-by-industry-3463524/.
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began in the east Midlands and south-east of England in August 2014 as part of 
CiSP. The global context for these efforts is illustrated by Verizon’s 2014 Data 
Breach Report demonstrating the wide range of sectors and businesses being 
attacked and how they are being attacked.33 Notwithstanding the policies set out 
in the 2015 SDSR, which will require time to mature, current government and 
police action has not stopped UK organizations and UK-based companies from 
being hacked. 
Among organizations attacked in this way are internet service providers: 
for example, in October 2015 TalkTalk’s unencrypted customer data, including 
addresses and banking details, were compromised with simultaneous financial 
reputational damage, including an immediate 10 per cent dip in share value. These 
hacks produce a wider loss of confidence in business dealings over the internet and 
exact unwelcome costs to business in insuring against malicious cyber breaches 
and the range of threats and risks. It is perhaps no surprise that business leaders 
are calling on the government to do more while recognizing that this is mainly a 
corporate responsibility. With the 2015 SDSR making clear that the government 
will seek to help companies secure their data, it remains to be seen what further 
breaches will occur and where blame will be directed.
The Institute of Directors has pointed out that ‘only “serious breaches” made 
the headlines, but attacks on British businesses “happen constantly”’,34 while 
the City of London Police Commissioner has stated publicly that 80 per cent of 
cybercrime goes unreported and ‘cyber-crime could become bigger than the drugs 
trade’.35 Cyber attacks already grab headlines and public attention; an attack on 
public utilities or financial services could have far more profound social, finan-
cial and political consequences than any cybercrime yet reported. This is already 
recognized by the EU, which is finalizing the Directive on Security of Network 
and Information Systems (NIS Directive): this requires CNI owner–operators 
‘to adopt risk management practices and report major incidents to the national 
authorities’.36
Against this background, the UK’s 2009 ‘Cyber Security Strategy’ led to the 
formation of the multi-agency Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) hosted 
by GCHQ, operating alongside the Communications Electronics Security Group 
(CESG).37 CSOC is intended to ‘actively monitor the health of cyber space and 
co-ordinate incident response; enable better understanding of attacks against UK 
33 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 2014, 26 July 2016, http://www.nu.nl/files/Verizon.pdf. These 
findings were reconfirmed in Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations Report 2016, 26 July 2016, http://www.
verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/.  
34 ‘TalkTalk attack: “urgent action needed” on cyber-crime’, BBC News, 24 Oct. 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-34622754.
35 Doug Drinkwater, ‘London police chief admits cyber-crime failings’, SC Magazine, 15 April 2015, http://
www.scmagazineuk.com/london-police-chief-admits-cyber-crime-failings/article/409167/.
36 The adoption of this piece of legislation is now doubtful following the June 2016 Brexit referendum (Brexit). 
On the directive, see ‘The Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive)’, 16 
March 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/network-and-information-security-nis-directive.
37 This group is still known as CESG, despite the somewhat outdated title, and dates back to 1919. See ‘CESG: 
the Information Security Arm of GCHQ’, https://www.cesg.gov.uk/articles/cesg-information-security-
arm-gchq, accessed 14 July 2015.
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networks and users; [and] provide better advice and information about the risks 
to business and the public’.38 It is designed: 
to monitor developments in cyber space (ultimately providing collective situational aware-
ness), analyse trends, and to improve technical response coordination to cyber incidents ... 
[for] a better understanding of cyber security risks and opportunities, it will also help to 
ensure coherent dissemination of information across government, industry, international 
partners, and the public ...  [drawing] from across government and key stakeholders.39
It is directed by the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), 
which in 2010 replaced the Office of Cyber Security (itself only established in 
2009) and works with government agencies and departments including the Home 
Office, MoD, GCHQ, CESG (which is housed within GCHQ), the Centre for 
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), FCO and BIS/BEIS. OCSIA is 
designed to advise the cabinet and National Security Council (NSC) by providing 
strategic direction and coordination for government in the field of cyber security 
and information assurance.40
In essence OCSIA’s remit is to try to ‘secure’ the UK’s cyberspace.41 This 
follows a line of reasoning presented by Betz and Stevens who, in Cyberspace and 
the state, argue that cybercrime and hacking represent ‘a significant challenge to 
states whose sovereignty and data security are in a state of constant skirmish with 
cyberspace challengers, whether they be state, non-state or quasi-state’.42 OCSIA 
built on the UK’s 2011 National Cyber Security Strategy, which had four main 
objectives:
1)  The UK to tackle cyber crime and be one of the most secure places in the world to do 
business in cyberspace
2)  The UK to be more resilient to cyber attacks and better able to protect our interests in 
cyberspace
3)  The UK to have helped share an open, stable and vibrant cyberspace which the UK 
public can use safely and that supports open societies
4)  The UK to have the cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability it needs to underpin 
all our cyber security objectives.43
The last of these objectives was part of a national education programme begun by 
the Cabinet Office and GCHQ through the National Cyber Security Programme 
38 Cabinet Office, Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: safety, security and resilience in cyber space (London, 
June 2009), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228841/7642.
pdf. 
39 Cabinet Office, Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. 
40 HM Government, ‘Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance’, https://www.gov.uk/government/
groups/office-of-cyber-security-and-information-assurance.
41 Shaun Harvey, ‘Unglamorous awakenings: how the UK developed its approach to cyber’, in Jason Healey, 
ed., A fierce domain: conflict in cyberspace 1986–2002 (Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies Association/Atlantic 
Council, 2013), pp. 261–2.
42 Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the state, p. 34. See also remarks at the launch of the book in Washington DC, 
1 Feb. 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NeA3r_s5zCs.
43 https://www.cert.gov.uk/; see also Thomas Rid, Cyber war will not take place (London: Hurst, 2013), p. 112.
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(NCSP).44 The NCSP began in 2011 (and continues to date), with funding of £860 
million through to 2016, although the overall figure spent on cyber security is 
higher.45 This £860 million was more than doubled in the 2015 SDSR, and the 
£1.9 billion earmarked for cyber security from 2016 to 2020 heralds the second 
five-year National Cyber Security Strategy and NCSP planned to be launched in 
October 2016.46 It includes funding for offensive cyber capabilities through the 
National Offensive Cyber Programme run jointly by the MoD and GCHQ and 
for strengthened computer networks within government. The SDSR also makes it 
clear that the government intends to be more open in sharing information on cyber 
threats, ranging from ‘lone wolves’ to APTs, in partnership with the private sector. 
Some information will also be shared with NATO and allied nations.47
Importantly, given the large number of organizations (a number of which are 
relatively recent creations) dealing with cyber security, the SDSR also announced 
the establishment of a new National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). This is to be 
based in London but under the leadership of GCHQ. The NCSC is designed to 
‘manage our future operational response to cyber incidents, ensuring that we can 
protect the UK against serious attacks and minimise their impact’.48 It is intended 
that the NCSC ‘will be the bridge between industry and government, simpli-
fying the current complex structures, providing a unified source of advice and 
support, including on managing incidents. It will be a single point of contact for 
the private and public sectors alike’ and will run CiSP.49 As the then Chancellor 
George Osborne recognized, ‘we need to address the alphabet soup of agencies 
involved in protecting Britain in cyberspace’.50 
Despite ambitions for the NCSC, GCHQ continues to claim the majority of 
cyber-security funding to ‘provide protection at pace and scale to key networks 
of national significance’. It will share intelligence on state-level threats and 
serious crime through cleared communications service providers to enable early 
warning to be given and action to be taken. While the 2015 SDSR suggests that 
this information-sharing will now be more forthcoming than formerly,51 much 
of GCHQ’s work to protect Britain’s CNI from cyber attack remains classified, 
with government oversight provided through the parliamentary Intelligence and 
Security Committee. 
44 HM Government, ‘New pathways for the UK’s future cyber security experts’, press release, 9 March 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-pathways-for-the-uks-future-cyber-security-experts.
45 Francis Maude, ‘Written statement to parliament. UK Cyber Security Strategy: statement on progress 3 
years on’, 11 Dec. 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-cyber-security-strategy-statement-
on-progress-3-years-on; National Audit Office, The UK cyber security strategy: landscape review (London, Feb. 
2013), http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Cyber-security-Full-report.pdf.
46 ‘New National Cyber Security Centre set to bring UK expertise together’, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
news/new-national-cyber-security-centre-set-to-bring-uk-expertise-together, accessed 9 June 2016.
47 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, pp. 40–41.
48 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 41.
49 Prospectus introducing the National Cyber Security Centre, 2016, pp. 2 and 8. Available from https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/national-cyber-security-centre-prospectus. 
50 ‘Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security’, 17 Nov. 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
chancellors-speech-to-gchq-on-cyber-security.
51 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 13; HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review 2015, pp. 40–41, 73.
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In addition, a Centre for Cyber Assessment (CCA) was established at GCHQ 
in April 2013. The CCA, whose membership is drawn from across government 
departments, agencies and law enforcement bodies, is the cyber equivalent 
of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre ( JTAC).52 It is funded from the NCSP 
and is designed to provide all-source intelligence-driven reports to government 
customers including ‘top industry bodies and companies as part of our wider 
work to protect British national security, our citizens and businesses’.53 These 
dialogues with industry are intended to represent a partnership between govern-
ment, regulators and industry.54
The government has promulgated a list of ‘10 Steps to Cyber Security’ as 
part of this programme in an attempt to improve business awareness of cyber 
risks.55 Other initiatives include a cyber ‘health check’ for FTSE350 companies 
and guidance from BIS for the financial services sector and for non-executive 
directors. In addition BIS has hitherto published an annual Information Security 
Breaches Survey, ‘to assess the level of information security breaches affecting UK 
businesses and raise awareness of the need for industry to take action’. This survey 
found that 81 per cent of large organizations and 60 per cent of small organizations 
reported at least one breach during 2014. These percentages were down from 2013, 
but the scale of attacks in terms of cost and severity was higher, with average losses 
of £65,000–£115,000 reported for small organizations and between £600,000 and 
£1.15 million for large organizations. Over two-thirds (69 per cent) of company 
boards now actively assess their cyber-security vulnerabilities, up from 44 per cent 
in July 2013.56 ‘Cyber’ has long been considered the business of ‘IT departments’, 
which are simply tasked to ‘get on with it’ with minimal board-level involvement. 
On the contrary, shared cyber security best practices need to be embedded in the 
same way that industrial and workplace safety and security are part of business 
culture, not an afterthought.
GCHQ also certifies companies working in cyber incident response, providing 
guidance on a ‘bring your own device’ security policy which allows people to 
use their personal computer devices at work, and engages with industry to try 
to ensure companies have cyber-security products able to defend against cyber 
attack. It does the latter through commercial product assurance, which includes 
publishing a set of security characteristics for domestic equipment required for 
the UK’s smart metering programme. GCHQ also works with private industry to 
conduct unclassified research, experimentation and code development.57
52 On the JTAC, see below.
53 The existence of the CCA was made public in June 2015, specifically to encourage these dialogues and partner-
ships. See ‘Foreign Secretary highlights the work of the Centre for Cyber Assessment’, https://www.gchq.
gov.uk/news-article/foreign-secretary-highlights-work-centre-cyber-assessment, accessed 29 Dec. 2015.
54 ‘Communiqué from the “Strengthening the cyber security of our essential services” event’, 5 Feb. 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284085/Communique_-_
Strengthening_the_Cyber_Security_of_Our_Essential_Services.pdf.
55 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-risk-management-a-board-level-responsibility/10-
steps-summary.
56 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 5. 
57 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, pp. 5, 9–10. 
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CPNI, meanwhile, works in close collaboration with key partners including 
CESG and the police, including specialist organizations within the police such as 
the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), located within the 
same building as CPNI, and the countrywide Counter Terrorism Security Advisor 
(CTSA) network. CPNI states that: ‘Government departments have lead respon-
sibility for ensuring appropriate steps are taken within their sectors to improve 
protective security. They also lead on the identification of critical infrastructure 
within their sectors in consultation with CPNI and sector organizations.’58 CPNI 
identifies the following government departments as having lead responsibility in 
the nine key sectors identified above: 
• communications—Department for Business, Innovation and Skills;
• emergency services: 
 Ambulance—Department of Health;
 Fire—Department for Communities and Local Government;
 Maritime and Coastguard Agency—Department for Transport;
 Police—Home Office;
• energy—Department for Energy and Climate Change;
• finance—HM Treasury;
• food—Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Food 
Standards Agency;
• government—Cabinet Office;
• health—Department of Health;
• transport—Department for Transport;
• water—Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
Despite these overarching roles, organizations and policies, cyber attacks 
continue to grow both quantitatively and qualitatively. In terms of CNI vulner-
abilities, Misha Glenny notes: 
Cyber weapons are the hacking tools ...  to penetrate the computer systems of an enemy’s 
CNI ...  such as their energy and water grids. Once in control of the system ...  the cyber 
commander can order their shutdown (or, as we know from Stuxnet, trigger a very 
damaging explosion59) so that in a matter of days the affected society will be reduced to 
Stone-Age technology.60 
Stuxnet was the vehicle for the most widely known, and most widely reported, 
attack to date on a SCADA system. Stuxnet adversely affected the centrifuges in 
the Natanz nuclear processing plant in Iran, unbeknown to the operators. The 
software might have been installed in the plant via a USB device rather than through 
external infection, although later it did ‘escape’ onto the internet, where it can be 
further refined beyond the original intent of its programmers (widely suspected 
58 CPNI, ‘Who we work with’, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/Who-we-work-with/.
59 Although Stuxnet did not cause an explosion it demonstrated a proof of concept that alterations made by 
computer code can have physical impacts. This can include explosions, for example by turning off safety 
features in ICS, including alerts for the operators that something is wrong.
60 Misha Glenny, Dark market: how hackers became the new Mafia (London: Vintage, 2012), p. 245.
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to be elements of the Israeli and US intelligence agencies).61 A less widely known 
but disturbing attack was made on the SCADA systems of a German steel mill in 
2014, causing the blast furnace to shut down with massive damage but no loss of 
life.62 States can lose control of the coding capabilities of the next generation of 
Stuxnets, which will have the potential to act on a much greater scale, and this 
poses a proliferation problem.63
In view of the burgeoning threats and potential perpetrators, the current patch-
work quilt of responsibilities and government organizations needs to be coordi-
nated through a dedicated and strengthened single body. The 2015 SDSR appears 
to intend the NCSC to be this focal point for CNI protection and for ‘cyber 
incidents’ more generally. But what now happens to OCSIA and CPNI and the 
other government organizations with a stake in cyber security? While the creation 
of a central hub for UK cyber security is to be welcomed, as is the then Chancellor 
George Osborne’s declared intent (as chair of the cyber subcommittee of the NSC) 
to make a ‘top priority of cyber security’, it is important to get this right.64 The 
National Cyber Security Centre could significantly improve macro-level tactical 
and strategic oversight, but still the risk remains that there are simply too many 
organizations dealing with many common issues.
The Royal United Services Institute has also expressed concern that cyber 
security in the UK is being dominated by GCHQ. Although there will be ‘repre-
sentation from a broad range of stakeholders’ at the NCSC, under the new struc-
ture ‘almost the entire focus of the UK approach to cyber-security [will be] 
located in GCHQ’. RUSI legitimately questions ‘whether this is entirely helpful’ 
and calls for ‘further debate’ on the point.65 Although much is yet to be resolved 
ahead of the 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy, this debate should focus on 
where to recruit new blood across a wide spectrum encompassing both technical 
and policy worlds, and where to draw from existing expertise, found not only 
within GCHQ, but also in OCSIA, CPNI and other relevant bodies, as well as 
industry.
It is commendable that the NCSC is intended to be staffed by ‘series of teams, 
expert in the cyber security of their own sectors, from banking to aviation, but 
able to draw on the deep expertise here [GCHQ], and advise companies, regula-
tors, and government departments’.66 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile considering 
whether GCHQ is set to become too powerful in the field of cyber security at 
the expense of other agencies and other bodies, such as the police—especially 
61 For an excellent synopsis of Stuxnet, see Ralph Langer, ‘Stuxnet’s secret twin’, Foreign Policy, 19 Nov. 2013. 
See also Kim Zetter, Countdown to zero day: Stuxnet and the launch of the world’s first digital weapon (New York: 
Crown Business, 2014).
62 ‘Hack attack causes “massive damage” at steel works’, BBC News, 22 Dec. 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-30575104.
63 Views expressed under the Chatham House rule at CyCon 2015, Tallinn, Estonia, 26–29 May 2015.
64 HM Government, ‘Chancellor sets out vision to protect Britain against cyber threat in GCHQ speech’, 17 
Nov. 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-sets-out-vision-to-protect-britain-against-
cyber-threat-in-gchq-speech.
65 Evan Lawson, ‘The Joint Forces Command and the 2015 SDSR: too soon to tell’, Royal United Services 
Institute, 27 Nov. 2015, https://rusi.org/commentary/joint-forces-command-and-2015-sdsr-too-soon-tell.
66 ‘Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security’.
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when the police, and many government departments, have seen their budgets cut 
through financial austerity and spending reviews.
CPNI already works closely with OCSIA and CSOC as well as the Civil Contin-
gencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, ‘which works to enhance the UK’s ability 
to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies’.67 Significantly, CPNI also 
maintains ‘close relationships with organizations and businesses that own or oper-
ate the national infrastructure. Relationships have been built up over many years 
between our experienced security advisers and security managers in the sectors.’68 
On the hardware front, CPNI ‘assures a wide range of physical security products 
developed by manufacturers for use on critical national infrastructure (CNI) sites ... 
[and] works with a range of external partners on the development of professional 
standards’.69 Domestically, cyber risk is built into departmental risk management 
as part of each department’s audited Statement of Internal Control.70 Cyber risk 
reviews for companies operating CNI have also been adopted.71
At the global level, CPNI has a ‘close relationship with many international 
partners, including overseas Governments, agencies and businesses’. This includes 
contributing to Overseas Business Risk, a joint endeavour run by the FCO, UK 
Trade and Investment and BIS, providing UK business with information relating 
to ‘security related risks companies face when operating overseas’.72
The British government also has responsibilities to its partners in NATO 
and, until the  UK negotiates withdrawal following the 2016 Brexit referendum, 
the EU that are described in the MoD’s Cyber primer document as complex—
‘a complexity aggravated by the need to include national organizations, such as 
computer emergency response teams (CERTs), and national and international 
legal requirements’.73 This complexity embraces:
a)  The NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency [which] manages those 
networks actually owned by NATO. Formed on 1 July 2012 ...  the NCI Agency also has a 
coordinating role across individual NATO and NATO-nation CERTs.
b)  Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence [CCDCOE]. Their mission is to 
enhance capability, cooperation and information sharing across NATO, and its nations 
and partners in cyber defence through education, research & development, lessons-learned 
and consultation. 
c)  ENISA. This agency is the European Union focus for technical assistance for the security 
aspects of cyberspace.74
This tier of international institutions operates alongside national cyber 
command structures, a number of which are engaged in liaison with the MoD. In 
67 CPNI, ‘Who we work with’.
68 CPNI, ‘Who we work with’.
69 CPNI, ‘Who we work with’.
70 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 14. 
71 ‘Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security’.
72 CPNI, ‘Who we work with’.
73 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-20. 
74 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-20.
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addition, there is a series of CERTs operating for national governments, universi-
ties and within industry—several of which are members of the global, but limited, 
Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).75 
The reasons for attacks on CNI are multifarious; Verizon’s 2014 Data Breach 
Investigations Report lists among them the longstanding problem posed by espio-
nage.76 This encompasses espionage by states as well as from private companies. 
The national interest remains dominant in conceptualizing cyber threats, but as 
we all swim in the same information ocean this does not deal sufficiently either 
with organized crime, which spans national jurisdictions (including those outside 
the EU and North America), or with building trust between states and state organ-
izations. This need for ‘building blocks’ at the diplomatic level to establish ‘red 
lines’ and rules for state behaviour in cyberspace was an issue publicly raised by 
Richard Ledgett in the October 2015 interview he gave to the BBC.77 In the same 
month, the Director-General of MI5, Andrew Parker, argued that the threat from 
terrorism stood at its highest level in his 32 years in the service, and that there were 
good reasons to increase international state-level collaboration.78
This call for increased state-based collaboration was subsequently incorporated 
into the 2015 SDSR, with responsible state-based behaviour in cyberspace champi-
oned by the ‘London Cyber Process’, which also paid heed to the challenges facing 
the current international economic and political order, identified as being ‘driven by 
developments such as the growing role of non-state actors, the impact of technol-
ogy and longer-term shifts of economic wealth to the south and east of the world’.79
For the UK, as a global financial and commercial hub, increased transparency, 
trust, and cooperation are also important for trade relations.80 This realm encom-
passes the series of agreements, to a value of £30 billion, into which Britain has 
entered with China (including deals on the UK’s next generation of civil nuclear 
power plants), and which raised concerns that these might provide gateways into 
strategic influence over computer-controlled UK CNI.81 With China and Russia’s 
intelligence agencies both accused of mapping the electricity grids in the United 
States and installing software traps which could be used to damage or disrupt their 
CNI, this concern cannot be easily dismissed, despite Chinese assurances.82 These 
concerns are sufficient for the new UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, to delay 
these civil nuclear deals with China while the government re-examines them.83
75 https://www.first.org/; see also MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-20. 
76 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 2014.
77 Corera, ‘NSA warns of growing danger of cyber-attack by nation states’.
78 ‘MI5 boss wants “mature debate” on surveillance powers’, BBC News, 29 Oct. 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-34663929.
79 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, pp. 20, 41.
80 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 17.
81 ‘Hammond rejects security fears over China investment’, BBC News, 20 Oct. 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-34582673.
82 Siobhan Gorman, ‘Electricity grid in US penetrated by spies’, Wall Street Journal, 8 April 2009, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085; Kamal Ahmed, ‘China admits—our reputation is on the line over 
nuclear security’, BBC News, 21 Oct. 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34595677. See also Alex-
ander J. Martin, ‘UK/China cyber security deal: national security attacks still OK, it seems’, The Register, 22 
Oct. 2015, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/22/uk_china_cyber_security_agreement_ip/.
83 Carrie Grace, ‘Hinkley Point: Theresa May’s China calculus’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
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UK intelligence organizations
As outlined above, part of the protective barrier for CNI comes in the form of 
data collection by the UK’s intelligence agencies: these comprise the Security 
Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and GCHQ, with SIS 
and GCHQ reporting to the Foreign Secretary.84 MI5 is primarily responsible 
for combating domestic and international terrorism and for counter-espionage, 
counter-proliferation and protective security and reports to the Home Secretary 
but it is not part of the Home Office.85 The mainstay of MI6’s remit is to collect 
secret intelligence and mount ‘covert operations overseas in support of British 
Government objectives’ relating to British foreign and defence policy, the UK’s 
economic well-being, and the prevention and detection of serious crime.86
As Alex Younger, the current head of MI6, warned in March 2015: ‘Using data 
appropriately and proportionately offers us a priceless opportunity to be even 
more deliberate and targeted in what we do and thus be better at protecting our 
agents and this country.’ He went on to caution: ‘That is good news. The bad 
news is that the same technology in opposition hands, an opposition often uncon-
strained by consideration of ethics and law, allows them to see what we are doing 
and put our people and agents at risk.’87 
Within GCHQ, whose ‘primary customers are the MOD, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and law enforcement agencies’,88 the main arm for dealing 
with threats to CNI is CESG. CESG acts as the ‘National Technical Authority for 
Information Assurance within the UK’ through three sets of interrelated activi-
ties ‘in partnership with industry and academia’ alongside their partner agencies, 
CPNI, MI5 and SIS/MI6.89 These three activities are:
• guidance and tailored advice to UK government and the critical national infra-
structure on the security risks of new and existing IT systems, providing ideas, 
designs and consultancy to protect against these risks;
• ensure appropriately assured products, services and people are available;
• deliver operational support to existing systems by alerting to specific threats and 
vulnerabilities, and provide incident response and technical solutions (such as 
cryptographic keys) to protect the most sensitive information.90
CESG also supports the British government by ‘protecting sensitive material 
from hostile threats’, ensuring ‘capability and capacity needed to manage cyber secu-
rity risks’, ‘securing Government interactions online with citizens’, and ‘advice on 
world-36937511, 31 July 2016
84 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-17. See also ‘Intelligence and Security Act (ISA) section 7’, 24 July 2016, http:// 
intelligencecommissioner.com/content.asp?id=24#.
85 MI5, ‘What we do’. 
86 https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html, accessed 18 March 2015. 
87 Gordon Corera, ‘Plaque unveiled for first MI6 chief Mansfield Cumming’, BBC News, 31 March 2015, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32126061.
88 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-17.
89 ‘CESG: the Information Security Arm of GCHQ’, https://www.cesg.gov.uk/articles/cesg-information-
security-arm-gchq, accessed 26 July 2016.
90 ‘CESG: the Information Security Arm of GCHQ’. 
INTA92_5_Stoddart.indd   15 11/08/2016   13:22:58
Kristan Stoddart
16
International Affairs 92: 5, 2016
Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
Information Assurance Architecture and cyber security to UK government, critical 
national infrastructure, the wider public sector and suppliers to UK government’.91
In addition, there is JTAC, which analyses and assesses all-source intelligence 
relating to domestic and international terrorism. JTAC ‘sets threat levels and 
issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from 
a wide range of government departments and agencies, as well as producing more 
in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities’. It functions as a 
‘self-standing organization comprised of representatives from sixteen government 
departments and agencies’.92
The 2015 SDSR increased funding for the security and intelligence services by 
£2.5 billion, half of which was dedicated to counterterrorism. This budget will 
permit the recruitment of 1,900 additional staff across the agencies described above 
to ‘respond to, and deter those behind, the increasing international terrorist, cyber 
and other global threats’, by means including offensive cyber capabilities.93 The 
bulk of this funding is expected to go to GCHQ, which remains the dominant 
agency for UK cyber security.94 
Within this framework can be discerned part of the rationale for UK participation 
in the PRISM mass surveillance programme.95 That rationale is also reflected in the 
National Security Strategy and in the MoD’s Cyber primer document, which states:
The National Cyber Security Strategy seeks to secure the advantage in cyberspace by 
exploiting opportunities to gather intelligence and intervening as necessary against adver-
saries. Commanders should consider cyberspace to be an area of intelligence collection 
and analysis in its own right. Intelligence support to operations within cyberspace is essen-
tial to provide knowledge, reduce uncertainty, and support effective operational decision-
making in defending MOD networks. It ... will include providing timely indicators and 
warnings ... [and] focuses on developing sound situational awareness and understanding 
by identifying trends and scanning for emerging threats, hazards or opportunities as well 
as understanding the consequences of any action. Cyberspace contains huge amounts of 
data which can be exploited and assessed for intelligence and situational awareness.
Furthermore:
When observing changes in cyberspace, timescales vary from days or months to milli-
seconds. Individuals and groups operating in cyberspace leave digital trails but these can 
be disguised, thus making accurate identification, geo-location and attribution difficult. 
Exploiting this data-rich environment requires thorough intelligence preparation of the 
battlespace (IPB). Cyberspace has three interdependent layers which align with, and span, 
the physical, virtual and cognitive domains.96
91 ‘CESG: the Information Security Arm of GCHQ’.
92 ‘Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre’, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre, accessed 31 
March 2015.
93 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 24.
94 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 40; Lawson, ‘The 
Joint Forces Command and the 2015 SDSR’.
95 Luke Harding, The Snowden files: the inside story of the world’s most wanted man (London: Guardian Books, 2014), 
pp. 155–69, 314–15, 323–8, and Glenn Greenwald, No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the surveillance 
state (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2014).
96 MoD, Cyber primer, pp. 1-25–1-26. 
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The MoD also noted that:
While there are no international treaties specifically governing cyber activity, cyber opera-
tions must be conducted in accordance with existing domestic law. The international law 
that applies to military cyber operations will depend on whether an armed conflict is in 
existence, be it an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict. 
Where there is no armed conflict, military cyber activities are governed by domestic and 
international law applicable in peacetime.97
Relevant domestic legislation includes the Computer Misuse Act 1990,98 the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 201499 and the controversial Regula-
tion of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000,100 as well as the equally contro-
versial Draft Communications Data Bill (colloquially dubbed the ‘Snooper’s 
Charter’).101 International law includes the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which 
adds both context and complexity to conflict in cyberspace. As the Cyber primer 
argues, this includes:
the prohibition on perfidy (inviting the confidence of an adversary as to protection under 
LOAC) and principles of neutrality. If the UK is the subject of an imminent or actual cyber 
attack that crosses the threshold so as to be an ‘armed attack’ as recognised by Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, the UK would be entitled to use force in national self-defence ...  Any 
response under self-defence must be necessary and proportionate. There is no consensus as 
to what degree of force constitutes an armed attack, other than that it must be an act/acts 
of armed force of sufficient gravity, having regard to its/their scale and effects.102
In addition, the implications of the law of self-defence turn on three practical 
issues: attribution; the speed with which an attack can be conducted, which can 
greatly reduce the ability to respond to an imminent attack; and the difficulty 
of determining intent, even if actions are provable and actors identifiable. Other 
difficulties posed by cyber events include deciding what is a lawful response to a 
(potentially hostile) cyber incident that may or may not cross the armed attack 
threshold.103 This calculation, which has to be backed by legal opinion, is compli-
cated by the ‘attribution problem’. Such an incident could be generated by a state; 
a state-based actor; a private-sector company engaged in espionage; a group of 
individuals involved in cybercrime, or a state sponsoring it for its own ends (includ-
ing for terrorist purposes); or an individual—whose reasons might range from 
malicious activity to curiosity. It is worth noting there have been cases of each.104 
97 MoD, Cyber primer, pp. 1-23–1-24. 
98 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/contents.
99 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/contents/enacted. See also Jemima Kiss, ‘Academics: UK 
“Drip” data law changes are “serious expansion of surveillance”’, Guardian, 15 July 2014, http://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/15/academics-uk-data-law-surveillance-bill-rushed-parliament.
100 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents. For countervailing views, see Big Brother Watch, 
http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/. See also David Anderson QC, ‘Independent review of terrorist legis-
lation’, https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/.
101 http://www.parliament.uk/draft-communications-bill/.
102 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-24. 
103 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-24. 
104 On cybercrime, see Misha Glenny, Dark market: cyberthieves, cybercops and you (London: Bodley Head, 2001), and 
Dark market: how hackers became the new Mafia.
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Although advances in computer forensics mean that the attribution problem 
is decreasing there have also been cases where it is problematic (often deeply 
problematic from a legal standpoint) to identify the perpetrator.105 This form 
of the ‘attribution problem’ leads to particular difficulties when the incident is 
a ‘nation-state like attack’, as it is known in the cyber-security community.106 
The attribution problem is already well recognized, and although a number of 
individuals have faced prosecution, many escape judicial proceedings (and it is 
quite likely that private-sector intrusions go undetected). Whether acts such as 
an attack on CNI committed by a cyber ‘gun for hire’ through the ‘Dark Net’ 
can be deterred or prosecuted is a major problem. By such means both states and 
non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) can 
have a force multiplier effect on states hostile to them and become ‘David’ to 
‘Goliath’.107 The possibility that ISIS and other hostile terrorist groups, as well as 
nation-states, might attack CNI was part of the reason why the SDSR increased 
the budgets for the security and intelligence agencies. In a speech at GCHQ in 
November 2015, George Osborne stated:
ISIL [ISIS] are already using the internet for hideous propaganda purposes; for radicalisa-
tion, for operational planning too. They have not been able to use it to kill people yet by 
attacking our infrastructure through cyber attack. They do not yet have that capability. 
But we know they want it, and are doing their best to build it. So when we talk about 
tackling ISIL, that means tackling their cyber threat as well as the threat of their guns, 
bombs and knives. It is one of the many cyber threats we are working to defeat.108
In that same speech Osborne unequivocally stated: ‘GCHQ is rightly known as 
equal to the best in the world. And I am clear that the answer to the question “who 
does cyber?” for the British government is—to very large degree—GCHQ.’109
Risk/resilience and UK ‘governance’ of CNI and devolved powers
Cyber security, which formerly fell within the purview of the Home Office, 
has since 2011 been overseen by the Cabinet Office, with scrutiny and political 
authority provided by the NSC. However, the picture is complicated by the fact 
that authority in some areas, including education and health, is now devolved to 
the Scottish Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and Welsh Government.110 
The political and social debates regarding the extent of devolution continue to 
evolve and are especially active in Scotland, which in September 2014 voted no in a 
105 Allan Cook, Andrew Nicholson, Helge Janicke, Leandros Maglaras and Richard Smith, ‘Attribution of cyber 
attacks on industrial control systems’, EAI Endorsed Transactions on Industrial Networks and Intelligent Systems 3: 
7, April 2016, pp. 1–15.
106 See e.g. Rid, Cyber war will not take place, pp. 139–62.
107 See e.g. Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the state, pp. 134–9; Jason Rivera, ‘Achieving cyberdeterrence and 
the ability of small states to hold large states at risk’, in Maybaum et al., eds, 2015 7th International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict, pp. 7–24.
108 ‘Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security’.
109 ‘Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security’.
110 ‘Devolution: a beginner’s guide’, BBC Election 2010, 29 April 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/
election_2010/first_time_voter/8589835.stm.
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referendum on full independence tabled by the ruling Scottish National Party, and 
where a second referendum cannot be ruled out. These constitutional arrange-
ments naturally affect the governance of CNI in the UK as a whole, and will affect 
it further if more devolved powers or full independence (in the case of Scotland) 
are ceded by Westminster. The so-called ‘West Lothian Question’, whereby issues 
pertaining to only a part of the union—especially issues affecting only England—
are voted on by all Westminster MPs, also bears on issues of governance of CNI.111
It is clear from the lists of devolved and non-devolved powers that while defence 
and national security remain under the control of Westminster, Scotland already 
has power for health, policing, the fire service and elements of transport; Northern 
Ireland for health and policing; and Wales for health, fire and rescue, and highways 
and transport. As noted above, each of these areas represents elements of CNI as 
defined by CPNI. It is important that cross-border collaboration for cyber resilience 
is clear and mutually reinforcing, because Britain is a relatively small land mass and 
what might appear to be a local incident could well disrupt or cascade to other areas.
Moreover, as the 2010 Strategic framework and policy statement on improving the resil-
ience of critical infrastructure to disruption from natural hazards noted: ‘There are some 
cross-sector themes such as technology wherein there may be infrastructure which 
supports the delivery of essential services across a number of sectors.’112 CPNI, 
which also supports Britain’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST), explains:
This categorisation is done using the Government ‘Criticality Scale’, which assigns 
categories for different degrees of severity of impact. Not everything within a national 
infrastructure sector is ‘critical’. Within the sectors there are certain ‘critical’ elements 
of infrastructure ...  The Criticality Scale includes three impact dimensions: impact on 
delivery of the nation’s essential services; economic impact (arising from loss of essential 
service) and impact on life (arising from loss of essential service).113
As Philip Hammond, the then Defence Secretary, told the Defence Select 
Committee in October 2013, CPNI is
where the impacts of cyber issues and cyber attacks on the broader national infrastructure 
are worked through, so that the vulnerabilities of utilities and other services that might be 
impacted by an attack on critical networks can be worked through and defensive strategies 
put in place. We have a number of mechanisms across Government that can absorb devel-
opments in one area and translate them into potential effects in other areas.114
Food and water are elements of national infrastructure (including some aspects 
clearly judged to be critical); these are among the areas devolved to the regional 
assemblies. Furthermore, central and local government is but one layer of ‘gover-
111 Duncan McTavish, ‘Debate: Scotland, the United Kingdom and complex government’, Public Money and 
Management 34: 1, 2014, pp. 4–8. See also Alexander Nicoll, ‘Britain’s integration debates’, Survival 56: 6, 2014, 
pp. 209–18; Andrew M. Dorman, ‘More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of 
Scottish independence’, International Affairs 90: 3, May 2014, pp. 679–96.
112 Cabinet Office, Strategic framework, p. 8. 
113 CPNI, ‘The national infrastructure’, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/.
114 House of Commons Defence Committee, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, 7th Report of 
Session 2013–14, vol. I (London, 18 Dec. 2013), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmse-
lect/cmdfence/197/197.pdf. 
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nance’; private industry arguably has as great a (or a greater) say over the rules, 
regulation and governance of each of these sectors—a number of which will, at 
some level, be integrated with one another.115 Clearly, there is a ‘patchwork quilt’ 
of responsibilities for CNI in these sectors and regions. The picture is complicated 
further by the fact that local councils, water boards and health-care trusts have 
their own sets of responsibilities and reporting mechanisms, while in some areas 
the private sector is dominant: these include communications, energy, financial 
services, food and transport.
For CNI protection in the event of natural disasters, there already exists a 
framework established following the Pitt Review conducted in the wake of the 
UK floods of 2007. The Pitt Review highlighted a number of resilience measures, 
among them:
• careful assessments of vulnerability, and prudent and proportionate risk mitiga-
tion activity, based on new, centrally defined standards;
• a shared framework to support cross-sector activity to assess, enhance and sustain 
the resilience of critical infrastructure and essential services to disruption;
• enhancing the collective capacity of critical infrastructure to absorb shock and 
act quickly when faced with unexpected events;
• effective emergency responses at the local level through improved information-
sharing and engagement before, during and after emergencies. 
These could equally apply to cyber resilience and help ‘ensure that the Govern-
ment, regulators, public sector bodies and owners of critical infrastructure are 
aware of the risks arising from ...  hazards and take appropriate action’.116 This 
awareness encompasses the impact on society and the economy, which again can 
be analysed through a set of principles defined by the Pitt Review. These include:
1) a risk-based approach proportionate to the risks involved; 
2) assessments of the likelihood and the consequences of critical infrastructure 
and essential services being severely disrupted, used to define standards and to set 
priorities;
3) calibration of the scale and cost of proposed programmes of measures to 
enhance resilience within each sector proportionate to the risks they face, including 
the ‘criticality’ of the infrastructure in question and its vulnerabilities, and the 
different options available to improve resilience;
4) cooperation and coordination within and between sectors and essential services, 
based on collaboration with the regional administrations on devolved matters to 
harmonize work programmes where possible to ensure appropriate standards for 
resilience are maintained across the UK;
5) planning to clarify the differences between sectors that arise from their different 
needs, circumstances and regulations with a view to building a National Resilience 
Plan for Infrastructure.
115 For more on the issues of public–private partnerships see Madeline Carr, ‘Public–private partnerships in 
national cyber-security strategies’, International Affairs 92: 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 43–62.
116 Cabinet Office, Strategic framework, p. 9.
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In practice this means government departments will continue to sponsor and 
take the lead for their sectors, and to share information on dependencies, interde-
pendencies and arrangements for business continuity management across sectors. 
This instils a precautionary approach to the uncertainties in the estimation of the 
risks posed covering all nine sectors of national infrastructure while recognizing 
that each sector is at a different starting point in establishing expectations and 
common goals. The sponsoring departments are responsible for deciding upon the 
appropriate security approach to be taken for their respective sectors. This means 
that analysis can be developed, and supporting evidence gathered, through formal 
and informal consultation to enable the development of sector resilience plans. 
This work should be coordinated with the CPNI and could be placed within the 
National Risk Register (NRR) or be made a subset of it.
Some elements of these proposals are likely to fall under the Civil Contin-
gencies Act 2004, and would be subject to ministerial approval as well as parlia-
mentary/regional scrutiny. This could be accomplished via national multisector 
strategic coordination and planning groups for national infrastructure, such as can 
already, in principle, be provided by CPNI/OCSIA and overseen by the NCSC. 
This could help coordinate top-down government action and bottom-up resil-
ience and recovery. In addition a National Asset Database, similar to that operating 
in the US and used as a ‘single classified prioritized list of [critical] systems and 
assets’, should be developed if it is not already.117
As mentioned in the Pitt Review principles, the development of sector resil-
ience plans could better enable ‘Government and industry working together to 
foster a collective responsibility for enhancing resilience’.118 The Pitt Review 
proposed that these plans be ‘developed jointly through a tripartite relationship 
between the relevant government department, economic regulator and industry 
sector’, and that they ‘should be public documents with controlled sections where 
necessary for sensitive information’.119 The Pitt Review also recommended that:
Responsibility for producing the Plans will rest with the lead government department 
for each sector, with information provided by owners of critical infrastructure within 
the sector. Sector Resilience Plans are reviewed in an agreed timeframe. The programme 
will review existing regulation and guidance, identifying best practice and existing gaps 
in provision. It will also review current affordability appraisal practices in each sector, 
addressing how any improvements can be funded and whether any legal powers are needed 
to improve resilience.120
Adopting this approach, which has both regional and national applications and 
implications, would foster periodic bottom-up risk assessments and analysis. 
117 http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-section124l&num=0&edition=prelim, 
accessed 3 Aug. 2016
118 ‘Learning the lessons from the 2007 floods: an independent review by Sir Michael Pitt’, June 2008, p. 242, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittre-
view/_/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/flooding_review/pitt_review_full%20pdf.pdf, accessed 26 
July 2016.
119 Cabinet Office, Strategic framework.
120 Cabinet Office, Strategic framework. 
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The Criticality Scale
The Criticality Scale, on which CPNI draws, utilizes ‘a co-ordinated approach to 
driving up the resilience of critical infrastructure’ while the Cabinet Office noted 
the ‘gap in the Government’s policy-making and delivery towards the protection 
of critical infrastructure from severe disruption caused by natural hazards’.121 The 
Criticality Scale is also useful for mapping the environment as it relates to cyber 
security, as can be seen in table 1.
In terms of mitigating risk and enhancing resilience, this provides a useful 
framework upon which CPNI can draw to map existing and future vulnerabili-
ties and to examine in detail the sectors concerned. This examination should go 
121 Cabinet Office, Strategic framework.
Table 1: The Criticality Scale for national infrastructure
Criticality Scale 
category
Description
CAT 5 This is infrastructure the loss of which would have a catastrophic 
impact on the UK. These assets will be of unique national 
importance whose loss would have national long-term effects 
and may impact across a number of sectors. Relatively few are 
expected to meet the Cat 5 criteria. 
CAT 4 Infrastructure of the highest importance to the sectors should 
fall within this category. The impact of loss of these assets on 
essential services would be severe and may impact provision of 
essential services across the UK or to millions of citizens. 
CAT 3 Infrastructure of substantial importance to the sectors and the 
delivery of essential services, the loss of which could affect a 
large geographic region or many hundreds of thousands of 
people. 
CAT 2 Infrastructure whose loss would have a significant impact on 
the delivery of essential services leading to loss, or disruption, 
of service to tens of thousands of people or affecting whole 
counties or equivalents. 
CAT 1 Infrastructure whose loss could cause moderate disruption to 
service delivery, most likely on a localized basis and affecting 
thousands of citizens. 
CAT 0 Infrastructure the impact of the loss of which would be minor 
(on a national scale). 
Source: Strategic framework and policy statement on improving the resilience of critical 
infrastructure to disruption from natural hazards, March 2010.
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much further than a dialogue with private industry and sharing of information 
on a voluntary basis; it should ideally be enshrined in law along the lines of US 
legislation and practices, as well as good practices found in Germany and Estonia, 
and the principles of the EU’s NIS Directive should be embraced (as they will 
have no legal standing in the UK after Brexit). These approaches are not an end 
in themselves.122 Dialogue and information-sharing on threats and vulnerabilities 
are a good starting point but do not go far enough. 
Private industry, as the owner–operators of the vast majority of CNI, along-
side the hardware and software companies upon which they rely for the mainte-
nance of their systems, needs to feel confident in the government’s ability to help 
them manage and mitigate these threats. In turn this would give the government 
greater confidence that they have grasped the national CNI environment and have 
a clear view of the landscape. It is not helpful to hold the view that ‘the owners 
of Critical National Infrastructure need to be held to account’.123 It is equally 
alarming that risks for the private sector are growing faster than their ability to 
act and governments are not seen to be doing enough. ‘Risk tolerance’ and risk 
awareness varies between businesses and sectors, while the British government is 
accused of being reluctant and too slow in sharing information/intelligence.124 
The revelations of the PRISM programme and the WikiLeaks disclosures of 
classified government information focused attention on the difficulties of where 
to draw the lines between ‘the need to know’ and ‘the need to share’ information/
intelligence; and the balance between them needs to be better managed.125
What is required in practical terms is for government experts from the various 
bodies outlined above, especially those from the NCSC, OCSIA and CPNI, along 
with those of the NCA as the main police body overseeing cybercrime, to be 
invited into the relevant facilities for ‘inside the fence’ site assistance visits. There 
also needs to be transparent discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of cyber-
security practices within each site and company, from which best practices can be 
identified for each sector or nationwide. This set of best practices could function 
in a similar vein to the US Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) 
Program. The PCII is designed in a way that protects commercially sensitive or 
proprietary information and is used to analyse and secure critical infrastructure 
and protected systems; identify vulnerabilities and develop risk assessments; 
and enhance recovery preparedness measures. Adopting this approach through 
domestic legislation would permit the British government and its constituent 
elements to harden the protection of CNI from malicious attack.
122 Kristan Stoddart, Kevin Jones, Hugh Soulsby, Andrew Blyth, Peter Eden, Peter Burnap and Yulia Cherdant-
seva, ‘Live free or die hard: cybersecurity and government/corporate responses to threats to SCADA and 
industrial control systems in the US and UK’, Political Science Quarterly, forthcoming 2016.
123 Views expressed under the Chatham House rule at the ‘National Security summit’, London, 21 Oct. 2014.
124 Views expressed under the Chatham House rule at the conference on ‘Cyber security: building resilience 
reducing risk’, London, Chatham House, 19–20 May 2014.
125 On WikiLeaks, see David Leigh and Luke Harding, WikiLeaks: inside Julian Assange’s war on secrecy (London: 
Guardian Books, 2011).
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Government planning, private industry and owner–operators
This approach is not without its difficulties. Increased regulation, let alone new 
legislation, is likely to be resisted by private industry for a variety of longstanding 
reasons. The UK government, with or without EU or US support, is also unlikely 
to favour increased regulation or legislation which promotes state intervention—
even for state-wide security reasons. Not only could this increase costs; there is 
also a legitimate question of where the expertise, as well as the money, will be 
found. It is also worth asking whether there is any political appetite for endeav-
ours of this nature in the absence of a major cyber attack on the UK’s CNI. Should 
such an event occur, however, the question would inevitably be asked: ‘Could this 
have been prevented?’ The answer to that question will depend on the nature and 
extent of the attack, the disruption or damage caused, any cascade effects, and the 
response and responsibility of private industry. The possibilities are not lost on the 
government. George Osborne stated at GCHQ in November 2015:
If the lights go out, the banks stop working, the hospitals stop functioning or govern-
ment itself can no longer operate, the impact on society could be catastrophic. So govern-
ment has a responsibility towards these sectors, and the companies in those sectors have a 
responsibility to ensure their own resilience. Any new regulation will need to be carefully 
done—light enough and supple enough that it can keep up with the threat, so it encour-
ages growth and innovation rather than suffocates it.126
The steps advocated in this article, alongside those contained in the 2015 SDSR, 
are designed to improve resilience to these threats in advance of any such attack. 
At the very least they will help both government and private industry to map 
domestic vulnerabilities, to assess what might be done to mitigate risk in a cost-
effective manner and to keep a watching brief on areas of mutual concern. Should 
the kind of ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ or ‘Cyber 9/11’ event evoked by the former US 
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta actually materialize, the results could be poten-
tially catastrophic. Such an attack could be directed at, for example:
• a chemical plant or refinery, leading to the release of toxic gases, oil or chemical 
spillages, or explosions;
• part of the UK traffic system: manipulation of the traffic light system in a major 
city alone could cause disruption or fatalities;
• dams, which regulate the water supply and provide electricity for large geograph-
ical areas; damage, destruction or disruption here could cause flooding, lead 
to a lack of clean drinking water and sanitation, disrupt navigation and trans-
port, and have serious effects on industrial plants dependent on water (e.g. for 
cooling) and electricity supplies.127
126 ‘Chancellor’s speech to GCHQ on cyber security’.
127 These examples, like the others cited in this article, are grounded in real-world scenarios. See e.g. ‘Iranian hack-
ers “targeted” New York dam’, BBC News, 21 Dec. 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35151492; 
Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov, ‘BlackEnergy trojan strikes again: attacks Ukrainian electric power 
industry’, Welivesecurity, 4 Jan. 2016, http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/04/blackenergy-trojan-strikes-
again-attacks-ukrainian-electric-power-industry/; Ian Hardy, ‘Are smart city transport systems vulnerable to 
hackers?’, BBC News, 5 Aug. 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36854293.
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An attack on any of these targets would place considerable strain on local and 
national response teams (including the emergency services and military). It would 
also place concomitant pressure on local and central government and agencies. 
The government, along with many others, is well aware of this. As the MoD’s 
Cyber primer argues: 
Business continuity means being resilient and maintaining service while under attack. By 
developing a plan based on risk, resilience, impact and interdependency assessments, the 
effects of such an attack can be mitigated. Operators need to be made aware of which 
systems and, more importantly, what information/data is critical at which times during 
operations. When considering business continuity plans, the following should be consid-
ered.
• Where does the priority lie in maintaining system availability?
• What is the impact of system loss?
• Who do I need to notify if I intend to close a system—or continue running it with 
known or even unknown faults?
• How is risk measured and managed and at what levels of command do various respon-
sibilities lie?
• What is the recovery plan?
• Is it frequently exercised using only back-up hardware, applications and data?128
While this is a useful series of questions to ask owner–operators in private 
industry, the UK government still needs to do much more to map and manage the 
vulnerabilities, mitigate major areas of risk, promote best practice through on-site 
inspections, and maintain a meaningful and transparent risk assessment process 
and risk register in a sustained partnership with private industry. Central govern-
ment can help to coordinate the work of local government, government agencies, 
the police and emergency services and, if required, provide assistance or request 
help from its friends and allies—including NATO’s CCDCOE. These measures 
will help to improve resilience before moving into the post-attack phase and, it is 
to be hoped, full recovery. 
Conclusion and recommendations
With the rapid expansion of ‘the Internet of Things’, and moves within the UK 
and other developed and developing states towards ‘smart’ cities and ‘smart’ grids, 
the potential for malicious action will only rise. The MoD’s Cyber primer states 
unequivocally: ‘Cyberspace is contested even in peacetime—threat actors are 
constantly probing our networks seeking vulnerabilities, intelligence or military 
and commercial advantage.’ It pertinently adds that ‘civilian and military infor-
mation infrastructures, whether national, coalition or international, co-exist and 
overlap, posing problems for managing security’.129 For these reasons the UK 
government, as a responsible global actor, continues to promote ‘responsible state 
128 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-30.
129 MoD, Cyber primer, p. 1-23. 
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behaviour’ in cyberspace.130 However, this may not be enough. As Singer and 
Friedman argue: ‘Cyber deterrence may play out on computer networks, but it’s 
all about a state of mind.’131 Jason Rivera also makes the case that ‘cyberdeter-
rence strategy remains largely unexplored and underdeveloped, due to a limited 
understanding of how the principles of deterrence can be applied to the cyber 
domain’—with the added complexity posed by the attribution problem and legal 
restrictions.132
With this is mind, and despite the measures in place, it was noted in exchanges 
of the Defence Select Committee intended to inform the 2015 SDSR that scenarios 
for a major cyber attack on CNI are not practised by ministers or by the NSC.133 
This is a gap that can and should be addressed (for example, through the Cabinet 
Office Briefing Rooms). This would be especially valuable because the risk of 
escalation (intended or unintended) is high, and while governments are looking 
to private-sector actors to do more, private industry is also in the line of sight 
for hostile state actors.134 Furthermore, the 2015 SDSR correctly noted that: 
‘Compromise or damage from these attacks may not be immediately visible.’135 
The SDSR also publicized the government’s intention to work more closely with 
the owner–operators of CNI and drive up security across CNI, and announced the 
intention to ‘establish a cyber training centre and test lab to support the develop-
ment of more secure technology’.136 Alongside this the government will practise 
‘new measures’ against electrical power cuts and will review current measures for 
policing CNI with a view to building increased resilience and integration between 
sectors and organizations.137 This is all positive and needs to be followed through 
in practice.
Currently, jurisdictional boundaries mean that many actors believe they can 
(and do) act with impunity. Responsible state behaviour means upholding the rule 
of law within and between states. Doing little or nothing about this at a global 
level ignores the fact that ‘cyberspace does have a direct effect on the information 
environment ...  is very disruptive of many processes heretofore considered safe 
such as the exchange of money and the relative security of personal, industrial and 
governmental data, as we can see from the burgeoning statistics on cyber-crime 
and cyber-espionage’.138
The volume, types and complexity of cybercrime, cyber espionage, and the 
kinds of APTs now being seen pose a problem that is not going to change unless 
more robust measures are put in place. This means the UK, its allies and its friends 
need to develop coordinated information-sharing on a global scale and a series of 
130 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 17. 
131 Peter W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and cyberwar: what everyone needs to know (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p. 147.
132 Rivera, ‘Achieving cyberdeterrence’, pp. 8–9.
133 House of Commons Defence Committee, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, 7th Report 
of Session 2013–14, vol. I. 
134 Views expressed under the Chatham House rule at CyCon 2015.
135 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 18.
136 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 44.
137 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 44.
138 Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the state, p. 129.
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state-based confidence-building measures rooted in international law. Prosecutions 
outside jurisdictional boundaries will need to be hammered out both bilaterally 
in test cases and multilaterally in environments such as the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF). Attempts to impose state-based law and state-based regulation must 
take account of the views of the private sector, which is responsible for 80 per 
cent of the business that takes place online and provides most of the hardware 
and software underpinning the technology that enables the internet to function. 
Systemic resilience can only take root through a multi-stakeholder system that 
recognizes the limitations on the ability of nation-states to police the internet. 
While recognizing these limitations, this article has highlighted a number of steps 
that can be taken to better protect the UK’s CNI from cyber threats, alongside the 
plans outlined in the 2015 SDSR. 
In summary: the National Cyber Security Centre is a positive step if it fully 
engages all the relevant stakeholders within government and does not exclusively 
reflect the views of GCHQ or government. Engagement and partnership with 
the private sector, and the owner–operators of CNI, are vital to the success of 
the NCSC and the government’s National Cyber Security Strategy. Legislating 
the reporting of cyber-security breaches to central government is essential for 
the protection of CNI. If problems remain hidden or unknown, this is a recipe 
for potential disaster. The Criticality Scale for natural disasters should be used as 
a measure of cyber resiliency and recommendations adapted from the 2007 Pitt 
Review should be implemented. Sector resilience plans should be adopted through 
CPNI and coordinated within the National Risk Register. A Protected Critical 
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program should be adopted along US lines but 
tailored to the UK. Site assistance visits led by the NCSC should be promoted 
for CNI sites and the threat environment as it relates to CNI should be mapped. 
All this can only be accomplished with the full agreement of private industry as 
owner–operators. While the SDSR stated that ‘the Government will avoid regula-
tion wherever possible’, this may not be a feasible approach if it is fully to protect 
the critical national infrastructure which underpins the British state.139 
139 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 73.
INTA92_5_Stoddart.indd   27 11/08/2016   13:22:59
INTA92_5_Stoddart.indd   28 11/08/2016   13:22:59
